This statement here also makes me think your adversary has some skill and authority. It takes care of all potential leaks from the operating system.
TRUECRYPT HIDDEN VOLUMES INSTALL
If you plan to install TC (and not hide its presence), then you might as well go with a hidden OS. You get no advantage by placing the sensitive data "externally" (unless you're planning to follow LockBox's suggestion and disclose both an outer and hidden volume just so no one will have any doubt ). If you're going to install TC and create a volume, why not just use the hidden volume and/or hidden OS feature. But then I re-read what you said, and you used the word "seized", which now makes me think your adversary might be someone with greater skill and authority. In that case you're talking about much lower standards than hiding something from a competent forensic examiner. Most of what you say makes it seem like you're protecting against a casual observer. I'm still not 100% sure what your threat model is. If you have multiple threats, then you should prepare for the one with the greatest skill. Sloppiness could definitely be a problem. If you really want to hide the existence of TrueCrypt from a skilled adversary, you've got your work cut out for you. If it's an adversary who has resources, then you might have to up your game. Your standards don't have to be all that high, and a little sloppiness probably won't hurt. And if you do, you probably don't need to worry about every last trace. If it's just a casual observer you're concerned about, then you probably don't need to hide the existence of TrueCrypt. Click to expand.I'm still not 100% sure what your threat model is.
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